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's discretion. The auditor's report is important because it tells readers of the annual report whether 
kept all the records properly and that the financial statements are prepared in accordance with the 
aining the location of the auditor's report. 
Auditor's report, auditor's report location, information signaling, profitabzlity, board of 
TRODUCTION 
The importance of the audit report is well recognized in Malaysia as it is covered by the Companies Act 1965 in 
various sections. Section 169 of the Act, for instance, requires the audited fmancial statements to be laid before 
a firm's annual general meeting. Section 174(2) on Powers and Duties of Auditors as to Reports on Accounts, 
calls for an auditor to report to the members of the company on the accounts presented at the annual general 
meeting. Auditor also needs to form an opinion regarding any deficiencies, failures or shortcmings he found 
while conducting the audit work. 
,I( The International ~Gderation of Accountants (IFAC) has also issued an auditing standard regarding the auditor's 
t report in its ISA 700 The Auditor's Report on Financial Statements. The Malaysian Institute of Accountants 
(MIA) adopted ISA 700 effective July 1, 1998 with the objective of establishing a standard and guidance on the 
form and the content of an auditor's report in Malaysia. Paragraph 4 of ISA 700 states that "the auditor's report 
should contain a clear written expression of opinion on the financial statements as a whole". According to ISA 
120 Framework of ISAs, the objective of financial statement audit is to enable the auditor to express an opinion 
whether the financial statements prepared are in accordance with an identified financial reporting framework 
(paragraph 11). To facilitate users' understanding, certain matters must be mentioned in auditor's report. ISA 
700 in paragraph 5 identifies the basic elements of the auditor's report. Auditor's report should include: 
f 
a) title; 
?, b) addressee; 
C) opening or introductory paragraph; 
d) scope paragraph (describing the nature of audit); 
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el opinion paragraph containing an expression on the financial statements; 
f )  date of the report; 
g) auditor's address; and 
h) auditor's signature. 
In addition to the above items, regulation 8A (5) of the Companies Regulations 1966 requires the auditor to state 
the f m ' s  name and the name of the signing partner in the audit report. 
Researches on the auditor's report have primarily focused on the issue of audit expectation gap (e.g. Guy and 
Sullivan, 1988; Garcia-Benau and Humphrey, 1992; Monroe and Woodliff, 1994). One important issue of the 
auditor's report that has never been investigated is on the location of the report in a company's annual report. 
Existing requirements do not specify the location of the audit report and therefore it is entirely the prerogative of 
the company's management to decide on the location of the audit report. We believe that, based on our cursory 
examination of annual reports of Malaysian companies, the decision on the location of the audit report is, inter 
alia, dependent upon the kind of news that fm is attempting to convey to the shareholders and users of the 
h ' s  financial statements. Our research question is thus: We postulate that if the firm attempts to convey good 
news, the location of the audit report is at the beginning of the financial statements and if the fm conveys a bad 
news, the audit report is presented towards the end of the financial statements. An indicator of the firm's 
conveying good news or a bad news is on the firm's financial performance. Findings of this study provide 
evidence on whether the location of the audit report supports the information signaling theory in the Malaysian 
context. We do not envisage regulation on the location of the audit reporting is forthcoming. Nevertheless, it 
will offer an explanation about a firm's decision to locate the audit report. 
Our evidence nevertheless fails to support our contention that auditor's report location is explained by 
information signaling. Our evidence reveals that about eighty percent of the sample f m s  placed the auditor's 
report at the beginning of the financial statements. We find that none of the profitability measures, our proxy for 
information signaling, is associated with location of the auditor's report. This evidence should suggest that 
auditor's report is important as firms prefer to place it at the beginning rather than towards the end. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we will present the theoretical 
fkamework and hypothesis. It is then will be followed by the methodology section. In the subsequent section, 
results arewill be presented and discussed. Discussion and conclusions arewill be provided in the final section. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Use of the Auditor's Report 
Several studies have been conducted to examine the auditor's report (e.g. Johnson, Pany and White 1983; Almer 
and Brody, 2002; Gomez-Guillamon, 2003). Boyd, Boyd and Boyd (200012001) suggest that expectation gap 
could be reduced if accountants do more work and dedicate much more resources to make clear to the public 
regarding the fimctions and responsibilities of the auditors in the preparation of fmancial report and enhance the 
educational efforts with all relevant parties. Auditor's role is not only to verify all transactions that there are no 
fkauds and errors but also to provide reasonable assurance that financial statements are fkee fkom material 
misstatements (Almer and Brody, 2002). However, they argue that the role of auditors in a financial statement 
audit has failed because the gap still exists between auditors and users in interpreting the role of auditors in 
providing information about a firm's continued existence in the future. They stress that the problem of 
communication between auditors and users (i.e. bankers) remains in that users may not interpret correctly the 
intended messages sent by the auditors. 
According to Johnson, Pany and White (1983), when making loan related decisions, loan officers indicate that 
there are no significant differences in the type of the audit report and the amount of loans eventually approved: 
namely qualified or unqualified reports. Thus, it may be concluded that bank officer's decisions are not related 
to the form of auditor's opinion. The evidence suggests that the role of auditors does not really matter to loan 
officers. In another study, Johnson and Pany (1984) investigate on whether auditor associations with forecasted 
financial statement affected the confidence of CPAs and loan officers on the said financial statement. They show 
that while CPAs association increases the confidence of both respondents groups, the loan officer responses for 
reviewed statements are lower than CPA responses for the clerical error variable. It also is shown that CPAs 
association does not significantly affect loan officers' final decisions. On the other hand, a study by Gomez- 
Guillamon (2003) show that decisions made by credit banks, savings banks and land banks are influenced by the 
type of audit opinion. The evidence also shows that auditor's opinion affects the amount of loans given, 
ns to invest or not in a company and amount to be invested. Additionally the information in auditor's 
is very relevant and useful for financing decision and would impact on the attitude of the investors when 
g or investing in a company. Thus, his findings contradict Johnson et al.'s (1983) evidence. This might 
to different methodology employed by them. Research by Johnson et aI. (1983) used laboratory 
ents whereas Gomez-Guillamon employed survey/questionnaires techniques. Johnson et al. (1983) 
:was an exploratory study; their response rate was lower and the "action" variables used (either to approve 
plication and determination of the interest rate premium by bankers) may be influenced by other loan 
sal characteristics which are not controlled in their research design. 
g to Anderson and Epstein (1995), auditor's report is the least item to be read by shareholders. They 
at auditor's report is not really helpful for shareholders in investment decision-making process. Instead 
laim that items in annual reports such as statement of fmancial position, income statement and historical 
g results are the most useful to them. In a study involving users of financial reports in Kuwait, Naser, 
h and Al-Hussaini (2003) reveal that auditor's report is perceived to be the easiest part to understand as 
ed to the financial statements and notes to the accounts. It is also found that the auditor's report is the 
dible item in corporate annual report. The study shows that individual investors indicated either 
as more important than notes to the financial statements, cash flow statement, retained earnings statement 
e board of directors' report. In terms of comparison between different groups of users, their study reveals 
vernrnent officials considered the auditor's report as important, compared to the other group of users such 
ed over the time and companies need to improve the manner in which they communicate their corporate 
on to the various groups of users (Epstein and Pava, 1993). This will help them to make informed 
in a timely manner. 
r, Reckers and Jennings (1996) study on the influence of "new" US audit report and gaud red flags on 
' perceptions of auditor's culpability. They find that the language used in the auditor's report could 
ence users' perceptions of auditors' responsibilities and could enhance the communication between auditors 
ers. The language used could reduce the level of auditor's liability or responsibility. In Malaysia, auditor's 
is are prepared by following the guidance in ISA 700 The Auditor's Report on Financial Statements; and 
preliminary examination of a sample of annual reports of Malaysian listed companies found that the 
or's report modification has been made because of changes in accounting principles, it will still not 
on users understanding except that it can improve uniformity among the report issued by auditors. 
to Malaysia, Best, Buckby and Tan (2001) investigate audit expectation gap among auditors, bankers and 
rs in Singapore. They reveal that the expectation gap is wide especially with regards to auditor's 
ibility, fiaud prevention and detection, maintenance of proper accounting records and exercise of 
nt in the selection of audit procedures. To overcome these problems, they suggest the use of a long form 
s report as practiced in the UK, the USA and Australia instead of short form auditor's report currently 
ingaporean companies. They believe that this could improve the business decision-making process. 
companies also adopt the similar short form auditor's report like Singapore. The disadvantages of the 
a u d i t ~ r ' ~  report isare that it does not provide readers with more information on the nature, purpose 
itations of an audit (Innes, Brown and Hatherly, 1997). Examples of audit limitations are the use of 
ple to test transactions, inherent limitations of internal control and use ofjudgment by the auditor. 
and Rittenberg (1987) examine the agreement on messages perceived fiom audit, review and compilation 
across CPAs and bankers. The objectives of their research is to test message understanding on 
ations, reviews and other forms of audit reports by including bankers from smaller banks and CPAs from 
g 8 CPA f m s .  The study involved bankers and CPAs in three states in the USA. The results indicate that 
lssimilarities between bankers and CPAs' perceptions on responsibility of auditor for financial statement 
be due to the size of the bank and CPA f m s .  In a similar vein, the expectation gap also does exist among 
partners and investors in the USA (McEnroe and Martens, 2001). Their fmdings show that investors have 
er expectation for various facets and/or assurance of the audit than do auditors in certain areas namely 
closure, internal control, fraud and illegal operations. Interestingly, auditors and investors concur that the 
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signal of unqualified audit opinion is more crucial than the signal delivered by any particular terminology used 
in an auditor's opinion. 
Due to limitation of the scope and content of the auditor's report, Herz (1947) suggests that the scope of 
auditor's report should be expanded to explain about operations of the business and financial result of those 
operations. He also suggests that auditor's report should discuss the realities in the report, be cautiously outlined 
and use simple language. On the usefulness of the auditor's report, Landsittel(1987) argues that the wordings of 
an audit report as well as a clean opinion can create public expectation about the h r e  financial health and 
viability of the fm. However, he suggests that changing the form of standard audit report would make it easier 
for the auditors to communicate their messages and therefore enhance users' understandability. Nevertheless, 
despite calls to change the auditor's report, the content of the auditor's report has not changed much since then. 
Perhaps, the reluctance of the accounting profession to change drastically the content of the auditor's report is 
largely due to the legal implications the auditor could face. Even though the long auditor's report not necessarily 
expand the scope of auditor's work, it still could explain the management duty on preparation of fmancial 
statement, independence of auditor and audit procedures carried out so that it can improve readers' 
understanding on audit report (Best et al., 200 1) 
Information Signaling Theory 
Information signaling theory posits that f m s  with good news have additional incentives to voluntarily disclose 
more information in order to distinguish themselves from less desirable f m s  ((Verrecchia, 1983). Signaling 
takes place when management discloses fiesh or latest information about a f m ' s  position which is relevant in 
valuation process (Eddy, Fletcher, Margenthaler and Reinhart, 1993). From signaling theory perspective, 
companies with higher levels of profitability have greater incentives to highlight their performance to enable 
users to distinguish themselves fiom other less performing firms (Houghton and Smith, 2003). By voluntarily 
disclosing additional information, the good news' f m s  could improve their image and credibility among 
accounting information users. According to Arab, Sedrine and Karaa (2004), dividend announcement also 
serves as one of the signals used to inform the shareholders about the viability of the firm in the future. They 
believe that dividend signals are reliable because it requires cash outflow and cash is not easy to be maneuvered. 
Results of their study reveal that fluctuation of share value is influenced by changes in dividends. This is 
consistent with Moyers, Rao and Regnard (1996) where dividends is regarded as a powerful signal about a 
firm's future cash outflow and a firm's risk class. 
Based on information signaling hypothesis, Buetow and Buell (1998) predict that management uses the call 
policy and the convertible bond premium (conversion value deduct the call price) as a mechanism to signal the 
potential security holders. However, this hypothesis has been rejected as finding demonstrates that management 
is more concerned with f m ' s  future profitability than with avoiding failed conversion costs. If management 
believes future operations produce significant profits, they will not call the debt to force conversion because the 
common shares will increase in value as profits increase. So, the hypothesis rejection indicates that the 
convertible bond premium is not a tool used by f m s  to signal their investors. 
According to Dartnell (2002), information can be divided into two, namely proprietary information and non- 
proprietary information. In the former, its release could adversely affect the future cash flows of the f m ,  such 
as a f m ' s  strategic plans and takeovers. The latter type of information is the one, if released to the public, will 
not affect directly the f m ' s  future cash flows, such as fmancial statements and the auditor's report. This type of 
information nevertheless is useful to users for predicting the future of a firm including its revenue generating 
potential. 
Due to the cost associated with disclosing private information, companies tend to hide inside information, 
especially of proprietary nature. This is because the amount of information disclosed is affected by the cost of 
the disclosure (Richardson, 2001). Therefore, these companies disclose information that is required of them by 
the existing laws. On the other extreme, there are companies that are prepared to disclose information on 
voluntary basis. So the levels of disclosure vary across f m s .  Richardson (2001) postulates that if the disclosure 
cost is zero, companies would be prepared to disclose all information that they have. But, when the cost of 
disclosure rises, the fm will less likely to disclose that information. .Further. Further, he believes that as 
information precision increases, the cost of the disclosure will increase to reflect the increased proprietary costs. 
He concludes that precise information is likely to be withheld kom the market due to the increased costs of 
disclosure. For the firms that are concerned with litigation costs caused by investors' reaction to imprecise 
information, more precise information is likely to be disclosed. 
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as that disclose private information could distinguish themselves from other f m s  with less information 
sclosure (Dye, 1985). He identifies three reasons why management fails to disclose non-proprietary 
formation. First, investors' knowledge of management's information is incomplete. Second, managers possess 
array of private information and some of the information may be proprietary and nonproprietary 
mation which may not be disclosed if it is part of such array. The third reason is due to the principal-agent 
m that exists between shareholders and managers, known as information asymmetry. Disclosure will 
the relationship between managers and shareholders to become worse. According to Dye (1986), when 
magers are in possession of both proprietary and nonproprietary information, nondisclosure and partial 
sclosure may be optimal even if credible announcements of all information can be made. Increasing 
mdatory reporting requirement will increase the incentives for voluntary disclosure. 
Signaling and voluntary disclosure theories predict that the inclusion of earnings forecast in the offering 
prospectus is intended to distinguish f m s  with "good news" earnings prospects relative to market expectations 
from those absent of forecast. The good news hypothesis states that, on average, forecasters have superior future 
cash flow prospects, relative to non-forecasters. To test this prediction, Clarkson et al. et al. (1992) investigate 
the role of direct disclosure in the valuation on initial public offerings (IPOs). They contend that entrepreneurs 
of high-quality firms can credibly communicate their private information to investors and will receive above 
average market valuation by undertaking actions that lower quality firms find too costly to imitate. They find 
that earning forecast firms have good news to reveal about future cash flow prospects, relative to non-forecast 
h s .  In a related study, Garfmkel(1993) hypothesizes that IPO under pricing is a method used by firms that 
possess private good news to signal about f m s '  quality and will enhance the price received in the upcoming 
security offerings. However his result fails to support the contention whereby IPO underpricing is not a signal of 
a firm's quality. 
and Smith (2003) analyze the presence and extent of graphs in the formal documents issued in 
takeovers in Australia. By using signaling theory, they argue that graphs would be able to highlight 
spects of a firm's performance. However, on the other hand, when performance is not so good, 
anagement may be reluctant to incorporate graphs into reports. They show that graph-based disclosures are 
fluenced by the nature of contest, previous performance of the target and takeover bid value. So it can be 
ncluded that other than for image, graph is used as a device to influence shareholders' behavior in corporate 
eover situations. 
Based on the above argument, we argue that the placement of the auditor's report is motivated by the type of 
news the firm intends to convey to the market. We predict that the decision to place the auditor's report relates 
directly to information signaling theory. This is because in the absence of any specific regulation on the exact 
location of the auditor's report, the location of the auditor's report is expected to vary across firms. Thus, we 
expect that management decision is not random but based on the type of signal that the firm attempts to send to 
users. We predict that firms that convey good news would place their audit reports at the beginning of the 
financial statements and firms that convey bad news would locate the audit reports towards the end of the 
financial statements. 
Hypothesis A company that conveys good news places the audit report at the beginning of the financial 
statements compared to a company that convcys a bad news which places the audit reports 
towards the end of the financial statements. - 
We conjecture that-the type of news conveyed is indicated by a firm's profitability. A profitable firm delivers 
good news to its shareholders. On the contrary, a firm that reports low profitability or a loss sends out bad news. 
Thus, a firm's profitability is predicted to be positively related to the location of the auditor's report. 
, METHODOLOGY 
Annual reports for the year ended 2002 of all companies listed on the Main Board and the Second Board of the 
( Bursa Malaysia, as listed on 3 1 December 2002, were included in this study. Companies classified in finance, 
I 
trust and close-end trust sectors were excluded because these companies were regulated under various Acts. The 
following research model is developed to test the hypothesis: 
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Where, 
Dependent variable: 
ARLOC : dummy variable: 1 if the audit report placed before income statement, balance sheet and cash flow 
statement at the beginning;, 0 otherwise; 
Test vhiable: 
FINPERF : f m ' s  financial performance (Tobin's q, ROA and EPS); 
Control variables: 
SIZE : f m ' s  size (measured by the log natural of a f m ' s  total assets); 
BDIND : the percentage of independent directors on the board; 
GRG : ratio of short-term borrowing to total assets; 
AUDOPN : type of audittor opinion (1 if qualified or adverse opinion, 0 otherwise); and 
AUDTR : auditor quality (1 for big-4 audit firm, 0 otherwise). 
Three measures of financial performance are employed, namely ROA, EPS and Tobin's q. These measures are 
proxies for the type of news a fm is conveying in the annual report to the users. The first two measures are 
accounting based, while the third measure, i.e. Tobin's q, is market based. Tobin's q is used because the 
relationship between market value and replacement cost is argued to be very important in the investment 
decision making processes. This ratio of performance is better than market-to-book ratio because it neutralizes 
the effects of different depreciation policies (Bouteiller, 2002). Behr and Bellgardt (2002) believe that Tobin7s q 
is a satisfactory statistical tool for shaping the investment decision if capital market is perfect. If the ratio is 
more than 1, it shows that the firm has stFong return on investments (Bouteiller, 2002). Dickerson, Gibson and 
Tsakalatos (1998) contend that if q less than 1, it indicates no positive net present value (NPV) investment 
opportunities whereas if q is more than 1 it presumes a fm have positive NPV. In a similar vein, Evans and 
Gentry (2003) contend that if a firm's Tobin's q is greater than 1, it indicates that investors have a positive 
outlook for the f m ' s  growth opportunities and it implies that the fm is implementing a growth strategy. On 
the other hand, a ratio below than 1 tells that investors have negative growth expectations and the firm should 
not reinvest in these assets. Furthermore, Tobin's q ratio is an accepted measure of a f m ' s  growth opportunities 
via its investment strategy (Evans and Gentry, 2003). As suggested by Lindenberg and Ross (1981), the ratio 
can be used to explore the relationship between market structure and firm's performance. Evans and Gentry 
(2003) agree that the advantage of Tobin's q is that it provides an estimation of a fum's intangible assets. It 
includes goodwill, future investments opportunities, market power and the success of the management. 
Therefore, ranking of companies on the Tobin's q value is similar to ranking them on the basis of expected 
future cash flows. According to Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004), Tobin's q does not only reflect the 
consequences of current management decisions but also of previous management. So, firms that have strong 
market power inherited fiom past management might also have high value of return on currents assets and 
Tobin's q. Thus, because it is market based providing a f m ' s  growth potential, Tobin's q is expected to be an 
important proxy for the type of news a firm is delivering to the users. 
We computed Tobin's q by using the measurement developed by Maury and Pajuste (2004) as the data is readily 
available. Maury and Pajuste (2004) measure Tobin's q as follows. The f m ' s  market value of outstanding 
shares and book value of debts are combined to proxy the f m ' s  market value. The replacement cost of assets, 
on the other hand, is represented by the book value of total assets. Therefore: 
Tobin's q = Market value of outstanding shares f book value of debt 
- . Book value of assets 
We included five control variables in the model. First, f m ' s  size is an important variable in voluntary 
disclosure studies (e.g. Mark and mssel, 1993; meek et al., 1995; eng and mak, 2003, mohd-nasir and abdullah, 
2004). In a study by mohd-nasir and abdullah (2004), they document a positive and significant association 
between a firm's size and voluntary disclosure. It is conjectured that a firm's size is positively associated with 
the location of the auditor's report. Second, board independence is associated with the board's monitoring 
incentives and transparency (e.g. Forker, 1992; chen and jaggi, 2000). In fact, mohd-nasir and abdullah (2004) 
show that board independence is also associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure among companies in 
malaysia. Thus, we predict that board independence is associated with auditor's report being placed at the 
beginning of the financial statements. Third, firm's gearing ratio leads to a potential transfer of the f m ' s  wealth 
fiom debtholders to the shareholders (jensen and meckling, 1976; meek et al., 1995). Hence, this leads to agency 
problem between shareholders and debtholders (jensen and meckling, 1976). In addition, the level of leverage 
signifies the closeness to breaching the debt covenants and the risk of financial distress, as evidenced in platt 
and platt (2002). It is therefore predicted that the level of gearing is negatively associated with the location of 
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the auditor's report. Fourth, the type of auditor's opinion is also expected to be associated with the location of 
the auditor's report. If the auditor issued unqualified opinion, the report is expected to be located at the 
beginning. If the report is other than unqualified, it is more likely to be placed towards the end of the financial 
statements. Finally, the type of the auditor also is conjectured to have an effect on the location of the auditor's 
report. Auditor's incentives to compromise with the quality of the audit are negatively associated with the size 
of the audit fm (deangelo, 1981; dye, 1993). Thus, big-4 audit firms, indicator of the auditor's independence 
and quality, are likely to be associated with high quality financial statements. Therefore, big-4 audit f m s  will 
lead to the audit reports being located at the beginning of the financial statements. 
RESULTS 
As on December 3 1, 2002, a total of 853 companies are listed on the Bursa Malaysia. Out of these, only 698 
companies (i.e. about 82 percent of the Bursa Malaysia population) are included in this study after eliminating a 
total of 155 companies for various reasons., as shown in Table 1. Another four companies are deleted after the 
analysis of outliers is carried out. 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
r companies on the Main Board as at 3 1 December, 2002 






- Finance (including finance companies categorized under PN4,8 companies) 
- IPOs during 2002 
59 
44 
- Companies in the Technology sector 
- Companies in the Close End Fund sector 
- Companies in the Trust sector 
- Annual reports not available (hardcopy) 
- Annual report not accessible through the internet 
Out of the 698 companies, 138 companies placed the auditor's report towards the end of the financial 
statements, representing about twenty percent. Thus, the incidence of placing auditor's report at the end of a 
financial statement is not widespread. To understand the tendency of locating the auditor's report by sectors and 
the type of the board listings, a cross-tabulation analysis and the Chi-square test were carried out whose results 






- Auditor's report not found in annual report 
- Chairman of the board not specified 
- Auditor's report not dated 
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Table 2: Cross-tabulation between Auditor's Reports Location and Sectors 
Board listingb/ sector<* Location of auditor's report . Total f m s  
At the end At the beginning 
Main Board 10 1 (22.5%) 348 (77.5%) 449 
Second Board 37 (14.55%) 212 (85.5%) 249 
Trading and Services 35 (25.4%) 102 (74.6%) 137 
Industrial Products 34 (24.6%) 171 (75.4%) 205 
Consumer Products 17 (12.3%) 81 (87.7%) 98 
Plantations 13 (9.4%) 27 (90.6%) 40 
Properties 15 (10.9%) 65 (89.1%) 80 
Construction 10 (7.2%) 36 (92.8%) 46 
Hotels 0 (0%) 6 (100%) 6 
PN4' 13 (9.4%) 62 (90.6%) 75 
Infrastructure 1 (0.7%) 6 (99.3%) 7 
Mining 0 (0%) 4 (1 00%) 4 
a PN4 sector was introduced by the Bursa Malaysia in 200 1 for distressed firms. * 
Chi-square test between board listing and location of auditor's report (Pearson Chi-Square value: 5.89, 
** p-value=0.0 1 5). Chi-square test between sectors and location of auditor's report (Pearson Chi-Square value: 1 1.69, p- 
value=0.232). 
Results in Table 2 suggest that a firm's listing status and the location of the auditor's report are not independent, 
as indicated by the significance of the Chi-square test. However, the Chi-square test between sectors and the 
location of the auditor's report shows that they are independent. It is interesting to observe that more than ninety 
percent of the distressed f m s  locate their auditor's reports at the beginning of the financial statements. This 
finding, thus, supports the evidence by Skinner (1994, 1997).. 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables examined in this study. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 




EPS (in cents) 
SIZE (in log natural) 
BDMD 
GRG 
AUDDLY (in log ten) 
AUDOPIN 
AUDTR - - 
b After deletion of outliers, the number of firms range between 696 to 698. 
C Median values for dichotomous variables represent the percentage of observations with "1" score. 
The means for ROA and EPS are found to be negative. This suggests that firms in Malaysia have not been fully 
recovered fiom the 1997 economic crisis. As for the Tobin's q, the average (and the median) is greater than "1" 
suggesting investors' positive outlook of the future growth of the Malaysian f m s .  A t-test for ROA, EPS and 
Tobin's q between PN4 and non-PN4 f m s  revealed significant differences in means. The means of ROA and 
EPS for PN4 sub-sample areis negative (ROA: -0.92, EPS: -83.35 cents). For non-PN4 firms, the means for 
ROA and EPS areis positive (ROA: 0.009, EPS: 7.36 cents). Thus, the negative overall mean for ROA and EPS 
in Table 3 is due to the significant loss experienced by PN4 firms. Surprisingly, the mean of Tobin's q for PN4 
fums is higher than the mean for non-PN4 f m s  (PN4: 4.58, Non-PN4: 1.22). Thus, it seems that investors have 
better outlook for PN4 firms than non-PN4 h s .  A t-test of total assets between PN4 and non-PN4 shows that 
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total assets of PN4 f m s  was substantially lower than total assets of non-PN4 f m s .  Thus, the lower total assets, 
being the denominator for Tobin's q computation, has driven up the Tobin's q for PN4 h s .  
A t-test is carried out to determine the differences in mean between firms that locate their auditor's report at the 
beginning or at the back with all independent variables. Results of the t-test are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: T-test results 











0.0510.10 significant levels respectively, two tailed tests. 
Results in Table 4 show that the mean for ROA, EPS and Tobin's q is not statistically different between f m s  
that place their auditor's report at the beginning and at the end of the financial statements. Nevertheless, the 
mean for ROA, EPS and Tobin's q is higher for f m s  that place auditor's report at the beginning than f m s  that 
place it at the end. As for the control variables, only the f m ' s  size, board independence and the type of auditors 
are found to have significant differences in mean. 
Logistic regression analyses are carried out to test the hypothesis. Three regression models are run, each using 
different performance variables. Results of the analyses are provided in Table 5. 
Table 5: Logistic Regression Results (Wald statistics in parentheses) 
Variables Predicted sign Performance Variable 
ROA EPS Tobin's Q 
(n=696) ( ~ 6 9 5 )  (n=696) 
FINPERF + 0.23 0.001 0.12 
(0.58) (0.20) (1.19) 
Size ? -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 
(1 8.46). (1 7.94). (17.41). 
BDIND + 1.49 1.36 1 .SO 
(3.37)' (2.88). (3.39)'. 
GRG -0.78 -0.1 1 -0.27 
(0.82) (3.39)- (3.60)~. - 
AUDOPIN - -  0.53 0.5 1 0.52 
(1.17) (1.10) (1.15) 
AUDTR + 0.54 0.54 0.52 
(6.42). (6.36). (5.95)' 
Model summary: 
pseudo-R* 0.063 0.06 1 0.065 
Chi-square 28.14. 27.19. 29.09. 
Overall correct classification (%) 71.0 70.9 70.8 
*I* * 0.0 110.10 significant levels respectively, one-tailed tests. 
Findings in Table 5 show that performance is not associated with the location of the auditor's report. This 
evidence is consistent with the t-test results in Table 24. Thus, the hypothesis which predicts a significant 
association between the type of news the fm intends to convey and the location of the auditor's report is not 
supported. Therefore, signaling theory is not supported. As for control variables, four variables are found to 
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have significant impact on the location of the auditor's reports: f m ' s  size, board independence, gearing and the 
type of auditors. 
Further analyses are then been carried out by incorporating audit committee indepeidence as recommended in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), fmancial distress status (PN4 versus non-PN4) and listing status. . In Model 1, 
audit committee independence is included. It is conjectured that if a f m ' s  audit committee is composed solely 
of independent directors, as contained in Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, the quality of the financial statements is 
high. Thus, this will be associated with locating the auditor's report at the beginning of the financial statements. 
Model 2 includes h s '  fmancial status. It is predicted that PN4 f m s  would tend to place the auditor's report at 
the end of the financial statements rather than at the beginning. In Model 3, a f m ' s  listing status is included. It 
is anticipated that h s  that are listed on the Main Board would more likely to place their auditor's report at the 
beginning of the financial statements than the f m s  listed on the Second Board do. Finally, in Model 4, PN4 
f m s  are excluded in the analysis because discussion in the descriptive statistics revealed that financial 
performance for PN4 f m s  are significantly lower than the performance of non-PN4 f m s .  Excluding these PN4 
firms could remove bias in the fmdings. Results of these additional analyses are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6: Further Logistic Regression Analysis Results (Wald statistics in parentheses) 
Variables Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4d 
sign (n=696) (n=696) (n=696) (n=623) 
Tobin's Q + 0.12 0.1 1 0.12 0.05 
(1.19) (0.99) (1.27) . (0.19) 
Size ? -0.29 -0.29 -0.26 -0.3 1 
(17.34). (17.34). (9.61)' (17.96). 
BDIND + 1.54 1.53 1.52 1.24 
(3.40)' (3.53). (3.5 1)" (1.76f1 
GRG -0.27 -0.25 -0.27 -0.17 
(3.61)" (2.74)** (3.65)" (0.39) 
AUDOPN 0.52 0.55 0.5 1 0.93 
(1.16) (1.26) (1.11) (1.39) 
AUDTR + 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.4 1 
(5.94). (5.99)' (6.241~ (3.23). 




LISTING + -0.18 
(0.48) 
Model summary: 
pseudo-R~ 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.06 1 
Chi-square 29.14. 27.2 1 * 29.58. 24.66' 
Correct classification (%) 70.7 70.8 70.5 70.0 
*I* * 0.01/0.10 significant levels respectively, one-tailed tests. 
d Results are_ similar when ROA and EPS were used as the performance variable. 
ACIND Dummy Gariable, "1" if all audit committee members are independent, "0" otherwise. 
PN4 Dummy variable, " 1" if a firm is categorized as PN4, "0" otherwise. 
LISTING Dummy variable, "1" if the firm is listed on the Main Board, "O", if the fm is listed on the 
Second Board. 
Results in Table 6 are generallyqualitatively similar to those shown in Table 25. All the additional variables that 
are included in the analyses, namely audit committee independence, PN4 status and firm's listing status, do not 
have any association with the location of the auditor's report. Excluding PN4 f m s  also does not change 
qualitatively the earlier findings. 
SUMMARY DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The importance of the auditor's report is well recognized. Naser et al. (2003) for instance show that their 
respondents feel that auditor's report is the easiest part to be understood in a financial statement and the second 
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[ most credible item in a corporate report. In fact, Al-Fbzeen and Karbhari (2004) also reveal individual 
11 shareholders in Saudi Arabia perceive auditor's report to be the most important element as compared to 
directors' report and other components of the financial statements. However, Ahderson and Epstein (1995) a 
L g u e  E that auditor's report is not very helpful when making investment-related decisions. However, mixed 
, evidence is offered with respect to usefulness of the auditor's report (e.g. Johnson et al., 1983 and Johnson and 
pmy, 1984, Gomez-Guillamon, 2003). 
b 
4 
: ~hough the content of an auditor's report is standardized by the accounting profession, its location is not 
regulated. It is therefore the objective of this paper to examine whether the choice about the location of the 
i auditor's report is motivated by the type of news the fm is conveying to users. We argue that the choice to 
locate the auditor's report is not random, rather it is done to achieve a f m ' s  particular purpose. This is because 
the auditor's report, issued by Malaysian companies, would state whether the fm had properly kept and 
maintained its accounting and other records and registers required by the Malaysian Companies Act, 1965. In 
expressing the opinion, the auditor also need to state whether the company had prepared its financial statements 
in accordance with the Companies Act and the approved Malaysian Accounting Standards. Thus, given the 
importance of the auditor's report and its contents, we predict that a f m ' s  motivation to place the auditor's 
report either at the beginning or towards the end of the f m ' s  financial statements is determined by the f m ' s  
financial performance (i.e. profitability), as argued by Houghton and Smith (2003) with regard to graph 
presentation in the annual reports. Thus, based on information signaling theory, we postulate that the higher the 
profitability of a f m ,  the more likely the fm is to place its auditor's report at the beginning of its financial 
statements than at the end. 
Using 2003 annual reports of companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia, our findings show that the incidence of 
locating auditor's report at the end of a financial statement is not very common where it accounts only about 
twenty percent of the listed companies. Thus, majority of f m s  place the auditor's report at the beginning of the 
financial statements. When testing the hypothesis, we found that none of the profitability measures (proxies for 
the type of news), namely ROA, EPS and Tobin's q, is associated with the location of the auditor's report. 
Therefore, a f m ' s  decision to place the auditor's report either at the beginning or at the end of the financial 
statements is not motivated significantly by the type of news it attempts to convey as indicated by a firm's 
profitability. Hence, information signaling theory with regard to auditor's report location is not supported. One 
explanation for the insignificant association between firm's profitability and location of the auditor's report is 
owing to the fact that the contents of the auditor's report in Malaysia are very standardized. Thus, it is rather 
difficult for the f m s  to communicate to users the type of news that they want to convey by the location of the 
auditor's report. In addition, the fact that the type of auditor's opinion is not significantly associated with 
location of the auditor's report could perhaps explain further the insignificant association between profitability 
and auditor's report location. The type of auditor's opinion is expected to have an important implication on the 
auditor's report location because the report is likely to be placed at the end rather than at the beginning if other 
than unqualified auditor's opinion is issued. This is consistent with the argument put forth by Landsittel(1987) 
who argues that the wording of an audit report as well as a clean opinion can create public expectation about the 
future financial health and viability of the fm. This argument is consistent with signaling theory. 
For controlled variables, our evidence shows that a firm's size, gearing, board independence and the quality of 
the auditors are significantly associated with the location of the auditor's report. The direction of association 
between the location of the auditor's report and gearing ratio, board independence and the quality of the auditors 
is as anticipated. Thus, the higher gearing ratio, the more likely the auditor's report is located towards the end of 
the financial st2dements. This is consistent with the earlier evidence which suggests that gearing ratio is 
associated with the risk of financial distress (Platt and Platt, 2002) and the conflict between the shareholders and 
debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Meek et al., 1995). The risk and the conflict motivate the management 
to place the auditor's report towards the end of the financial statements. A negative association between a f m ' s  
size and the location of the auditor's report is not expected as in voluntary disclosure research where its 
association with a f m ' s  size is positive (e.g. Meek et al., 1995, Eng and Mark, 2003, Mohd-Nasir and 
Abdullah, 2004). One explanation is that in the voluntary disclosure studies, size is a proxy for information 
availability. Large f m s  are more able to have accounting systems which could gather a lot more information 
than smaller f m s  could. This ability is, however, not translated into locating the auditor's report at the 
beginning. Perhaps, large fums are more concerned with the financial results and thus present this information 
to users first than the location of the auditor's reports. Therefore, large f m s  would likely present the financial 
results first and the auditor's reports are presented towards the end. 
The extent of the board being independent of management is also found to lead to the auditor's report being 
placed at the beginning of the firm's financial statements, consistent with earlier evidence (e.g. Chen and Jaggi, 
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2000; Mohd-Nasir and Abdullah, 2004) which shows that board independence is associated with corporate 
transparency. Placing the auditor's report at the beginning by independent boards could send a signal to users 
that the fum is serious about promoting accountability through transparency. This is because decision on the 
location of the auditor's report at the beginning of the financial statements is entirely management discretion 
and it can be interpreted as a way of promoting corporate accountability. The positive association between the 
type of auditors and the location of the auditor's report is consistent with the auditor quality literature (e.g. 
DeAngelo, 198 1; Dye, 1993). Thus, given the perceived high independence of these auditors, the clients would 
send this signal to users by placing the auditor's report at the beginning of the financial statements. 
As a conclusion, findings of this study demonstrate that a fum's financial performance is not important in 
predicting the location of the auditor's report. Though, it is conjectured that, based on information signaling 
theory, the type of news would have an important bearing on management decision to place the auditor's report, 
this is not supported in our study within the Malaysian setting. The contents of the auditor's report potentially 
convey important news about a f m ' s  compliance with both the Companies Act 1965 requirements and FRS 
and more importantly the auditor's opinion on a fum's financial position. The better the financial performance, 
the more likely it is for the fm to present the auditor's report at the beginning of the financial statements rather 
than at the end. Nevertheless, our evidence reveals that corporate governance variables, namely board 
independence, the type of auditors and gearing ratio are important in predicting the location of the auditor's 
report. Thus, these corporate variables do play an important role in promoting transparency and accountability 
by presenting the results of the audit early rather than towards the end of the financial statements. 
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